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SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS AND THE PRIVATE
BENEFIT DOCTRINE: WILL PARTICIPATION
JEOPARDIZE A NONPROFIT’S TAXEXEMPT STATUS?
Peter G. Dagher Jr.*
In August 2012, the first social impact bond in the United States was
implemented, introducing a revolutionary framework that aligns the
incentives of the participants and provides nonprofits with a steady source
of long term funding to scale up social projects. In the prevailing social
impact bond structure, private investors essentially place a bet with a
government agency that the selected nonprofits will accomplish
measureable goals through a comprehensive project designed to reduce
public costs. If the program fails to reach these goals, the investors lose the
bet and their entire financial commitment to the social impact bond. If the
program succeeds, the government agency repays the initial investment
plus a profit margin to the investors. This Note examines social impact
bonds from a nonprofit’s perspective and answers the question whether the
profit margin that the private investors may achieve would qualify as an
impermissible private benefit that would allow the IRS to revoke a
participating nonprofit’s tax-exempt status.
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“We currently call charity giving money away and business as business,
[but] this is somewhere in between.”1

INTRODUCTION
A social impact bond (SIB) is a new financing mechanism gaining
widespread international attention, where private investors provide access
to large amounts of working capital money to nonprofits.2 In return, the
government promises to repay this amount plus interest if the nonprofits
meet specified outcomes that result in public savings.3 This device creates
a quasi–equity instrument through a unique agreement structure among the
participants (investors, government, and nonprofits).4 If the nonprofits are
successful in reaching the outcomes agreed upon in the SIB, private
investors will receive a profitable payout—potentially raising issues with
the participating nonprofits’ tax-exempt status.5 If unsuccessful, the
government is not obliged to pay, leaving the financial risk with the
investors.6
On August 2, 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
announced that Goldman Sachs agreed to loan MDRC7 $9.6 million in the
first-ever SIB in the United States.8 The SIB was designed to implement a
comprehensive recidivism prevention program for former juvenile prisoners
on Rikers Island that aims to reduce reincarceration rates and the associated

1. Lucas Kavner, Social Impact Bonds Help Investors Bridge Philanthropy and
Business Goals, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/10/18/social-impact-bonds-investing-philanthropy_n_1979614.html
(quoting
Sonal Shah, former White House Director of the Office of Social Innovation and Civic
Participation).
2. See MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT
BONDS TO THE US 7, 12–16 (2012) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT], available at https://
mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Social-Innovation/McKinsey_Social_Impact_
Bonds_Report.pdf. SIB literature usually uses the term “service providers” to refer to the
role typically performed by nonprofits because the term is more inclusive and SIBs could
also potentially work with a for-profit entity taking on the same responsibilities as
nonprofits. This Note discusses the issues faced by nonprofits involved in SIBs and, as such,
will exclusively refer to “service providers” as nonprofits.
3. See id.
4. See Esmé E. Deprez & Michelle Kaske, Goldman Sachs Inmate Bet Fuels SocialImpact Bonds: Muni Credit, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-21/goldman-sachs-inmate-bet-fuels-social-impact-bondsmuni-credit.html.
5. Charitable nonprofits that pay out profits could lose their tax-exempt status. See
Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled
Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2473 (2005).
6. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
7. MDRC is a tax-exempt nonprofit under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code that provides educational and social services for disadvantaged populations. See
MDRC FINANCIAL STATEMENTS TOGETHER WITH REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS 5 (2011), available at http://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/img/mdrc_2011
_audit_report.pdf.
8. See David W. Chen, Goldman To Invest in City Jail Program, Profiting If
Recidivism Falls Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2012.
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costs to the government.9 This innovative new investment was the second
of its kind in the world10 and marks what could be a major shift in the way
that nonprofits, the government, and the private sector interact with one
another.11
The Rikers Island SIB is structured as a $9.6 million loan from Goldman
Sachs to MDRC, the managing nonprofit, which has contracted with the
Osborne Association and the Friends of Island Academy to establish the
Adolescent Behavioral Learning Experience (ABLE) program.12 ABLE is
designed to reduce the recidivism rates for former juvenile inmates from the
Rikers Island Prison, where an alarming 50 percent of young offenders are
imprisoned again within a year of release.13 The Vera Institute of Justice
will provide an independent assessment of whether the project successfully
reaches its benchmarks.14 The New York City Department of Correction
has agreed to pay MDRC if the target population’s recidivism rate
decreases by at least 10 percent over four years.15 If successful, MDRC
would then repay Goldman Sachs the principal amount plus a variable rate
of return up to 20 percent.16 Even if the program fails to reach the targeted
10 percent reduction in recidivism, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Mayor
Bloomberg’s own nonprofit organization, supplied MDRC with a $7.2
million grant to be held as a guarantee for that portion of Goldman Sachs’s
9. See id.
10. The first ever SIB was developed in 2010 between a consortium of charitable and
private investors, a collection of nonprofits, and the British government. See JITINDER KOHLI
ET AL., WHAT ARE SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS? AN INNOVATIVE NEW FINANCING TOOL FOR
SOCIAL PROGRAMS 3–4 (2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/86267243/WhatAre-Social-Impact-Bonds; Tina Rosenberg, The Promise of Social Impact Bonds, N.Y.
TIMES (June 20, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/thepromise-of-social-impact-bonds/. For additional information on this SIB, see infra notes
200–08 and accompanying text.
11. See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Goldman Sachs Looks To Turn a Profit on a Program To
Fight Recidivism, NATION (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/169472/
goldman-sachs-looks-turn-profit-program-fight-recidivism.
12. ABLE is a multifaceted program to provide helpful intervention services to sixteen
to eighteen year olds at Rikers Island and after release. The program is designed to decrease
participant recidivism through improved decision making, problem solving, and self-control
training. ABLE plans to assist roughly 3,000 adolescents each year for the four-year term of
the SIB. See Presentation, Mayor of N.Y.C. Michael Bloomberg, Bringing Social Impact
Bonds to New York City 5 (2012), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/sib_media_
presentation_080212.pdf [hereinafter Bloomberg Presentation].
13. See Kristina Costa & Jitinder Kohli, Social Impact Bonds: New York City and
Massachusetts To Launch the First Social Impact Bond Programs in the United States,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
economy/news/2012/11/05/43834/new-york-city-and-massachusetts-to-launch-the-firstsocial-impact-bond-programs-in-the-united-states/.
14. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 4.
15. See id. at 7.
16. The variable rate of return to be paid is determined by the reduction in recidivism
rates. See id. at 6–7 (showing that if recidivism is reduced by 20 percent, the Department of
Correction will pay MDRC $11,712,000 to repay Goldman Sachs plus interest); see also
M.S., Social-Impact Bonds: I’ll Put $2.4m on Recidivism To Fall, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6,
2012, 12:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/08/socialimpact-bonds.
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investment.17 This unique feature18 of the Rikers Island SIB limits
Goldman Sachs’ exposure to only a $2.4 million downside if the program
fails to reduce recidivism by 10 percent.19
While the Rikers Island program was the first SIB in the United States,
SIBs are gaining national attention with additional programs planned in
numerous other locations in the United States.20 The potential market for
SIBs may represent “a multi-billion dollar source of growth capital for the
social sector.”21
Numerous types of programs have been identified as compatible with
SIBs; however, the initial projects have been implemented to reduce
recidivism.22 In the United States alone, over $6 billion taxpayer dollars
are spent each year to incarcerate juveniles.23 SIBs are well suited to tackle
this problem, since the effects of past social service programs in the field
have been easy to monitor and result in quantifiable savings to the
government.24 Other potential programs must be able to show that the
government would be capable of saving money from outcomes that are
easily observed and measured.25 In particular, homelessness programs have
been identified as another future SIB application.26 Homelessness is an
area where the U.S. government spends several billons of dollars per year
on remedial programs but very little in preventive programs that are
compatible with the SIB model.27 In fact, additional projects have been
planned in Massachusetts to address juvenile justice and homelessness.28
SIBs have also been suggested for projects improving preventive

17. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 4.
18. The guarantee provided in the Rikers Island SIB to cover downside risk is not a
typical component of the conventional SIB structure. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13.
19. See Deprez & Kaske, supra note 4. For a detailed illustration of how the SIB
functions, see Costa & Kohli, supra note 13.
20. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Ohio have also contemplated initiating SIBs. See
Chen, supra note 8; see also KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 10.
21. SOCIAL FINANCE, A NEW TOOL FOR SCALING IMPACT: HOW SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
CAN MOBILIZE PRIVATE CAPITAL TO ADVANCE SOCIAL GOOD 32 (2012), available at
http://www.socialfinanceus.org/sites/socialfinanceus.org/files/small.SocialFinanceWPSingle
FINAL_0.pdf.
22. See KRISTINA COSTA ET AL., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
17 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/FAQ
SocialImpactBonds-1.pdf.
23. Drew von Glahn & Caroline Whistler, Translating Plain English: Can the
Peterborough Social Impact Bond Construct Apply Stateside?, COMMUNITY DEV.
INVESTMENT REV., 2011, at 58.
24. See JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A PROMISING NEW FINANCING
MODEL TO ACCELERATE SOCIAL INNOVATION AND IMPROVE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 21
(2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/02/
pdf/social_impact_bonds.pdf; von Glahn & Whistler, supra note 23, at 58, 61.
25. See JITINDER KOHLI ET AL., FACT SHEET: SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS: A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO A NEW FINANCING TOOL FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2 (2012), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/sib_fact_sheet.pdf.
26. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 22.
27. See id.
28. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13.
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healthcare,29 workforce development,30 and early education programs.31
Accordingly, there are many possible applications for SIBs to assist the
underprivileged and lessen the government’s burden.
The question remains: How can tax-exempt nonprofits participate in
SIBs when federal laws deny tax-exempt status to organizations that confer
substantial benefits on private interests not among the charitable class?32
This Note will examine the impact of nonprofit SIB participation through
analysis of the private benefit doctrine—the primary IRS method to police
third-party profit taking.33 Despite the benefits to each SIB participant,34
the arrangement is likely to implicate private benefit issues because private
investors stand to receive their principal plus interest-like profits depending
on the success of the nonprofit service providers.35
Part I begins with an explanation of the relationship between the
government and nonprofits by examining the contours of the federal tax
exemption. This Note then briefly examines the process for a nonprofit to
obtain the federal tax exemption and focus on one of the main limitations
on the exemption36—the private benefit doctrine.37 Next, this Note
attempts to organize the various forms of private benefit identified by the
IRS and the courts into three general categories. Lastly, Part I explains the
specifics of the SIB structure in detail, followed by an examination of the
potential benefits and risks to the government, private investors, and
nonprofits.
Part II addresses this Note’s central issue: how nonprofit participation in
a SIB may violate the private benefit doctrine and result in the loss of the
tax exemption.38 This part explains how SIBs present a challenge to the
status quo of the private benefit doctrine, defying simple analogy to the
29. The city of Fresno is contemplating a SIB to reduce the rate of asthma-related
emergencies. See Manuela Badawy, California City Seeks To Cut Asthma Rate via Bond
Issue, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/usinvesting-impactbonds-health-idUSBRE89I0U120121019.
30. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 2, 5.
31. See Chen, supra note 8.
32. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 537 (10th ed.
2011).
33. See Darryll K. Jones, Third-Party Profit-Taking in Tax Exemption Jurisprudence,
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 984.
34. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
35. Cf. Christopher C. Archer, Comment, Private Benefit for the Public Good:
Promoting Foundation Investment in the “Fourth Sector” To Provide More Efficient and
Effective Social Missions, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 159, 188 (2011).
36. This Note focuses on private benefit—the main issue that may arise for nonprofits
participating in SIBs. This Note does not address unrelated exemption limitations.
37. If a prohibited private benefit is found, a nonprofit will either lose its tax-exempt
status or fail to qualify for the exemption. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 536–37.
38. This Note explores the question whether an impermissible private benefit occurs in
SIBs; it does not purport to address what options may be available to nonprofits that do in
fact lose or fail to qualify for the tax exemption. For further discussion on the potential
recourse available to such nonprofits, see generally Richard L. Schmalbeck, Declaratory
Judgments and Charitable Borders (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
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established private benefit doctrine. Part II compares the potential private
benefit occurring in SIBs with the categories identified in Part I.A.3.
Juxtaposing these recognized private benefit transactions with the new
issues presented by SIBs will indicate whether the similarities are strong
enough to fall within the outer limits of the doctrine. Ultimately, this part
seeks to answer the question: Given what is known about the private
benefit doctrine, would participation in a SIB jeopardize a nonprofit’s taxexempt status?
Part III recommends how and why the private benefit doctrine should be
modified to promote SIBs. Finally, this part suggests methods to structure
SIBs in a manner that could mitigate the private benefit threat.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION & SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
This part of the Note covers two distinct topics. Part I.A offers
background on the federal tax exemption and the private benefit doctrine.
Part I.B examines the SIB concept, highlighting how they are designed to
be implemented and how they would impact the participants.
A. Tax-Exempt Status Requirements and the Private Benefit Doctrine
First, this section describes how nonprofits operate and how the IRS
awards the tax exemption. Next, it details the private benefit doctrine as
one of the main limitations on the federal tax exemption. Finally, this
section traces the development of the private benefit doctrine and organizes
its application into several categories.
1. Federal Tax Exemption Basics
What separates a nonprofit entity from a for-profit entity is that nonprofit
entities cannot distribute profits for the private benefit of another person.39
A nonprofit is an entity that is organized to pursue a recognized social
purpose, while for-profits seek to further the economic interests of their
owners.40 To establish a nonprofit, an organization must first be a
corporation, charitable trust, unincorporated association, or limited liability
company.41 Among these alternatives, each structure carries different
documentation, governance, tax, and liability effects.42 Obtaining taxexempt status however, is an entirely separate undertaking.43

39. See EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY?
SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH 18 (2d ed. 2012); see also Henry Hansmann, Economic
Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 27–28 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987) (describing this limitation as the “nondistribution constraint”).
40. See CHERYL SOROKIN ET AL., NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 3–4 (3d
ed. 2011).
41. See LISA A. RUNQUIST, THE ABCS OF NONPROFITS 1–7 (2005).
42. See id. at 8–9.
43. See id. at ix.
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Contrary to common belief,44 nonprofits may be either taxable or tax
exempt.45 Recognizing this distinction, it is important to note that not all
nonprofits are tax exempt, but all tax-exempt organizations are nonprofits.46
Obtaining and keeping the tax exemption is very important to nonprofit
organizations due to the substantial advantages that come with it.47 First,
nonprofits avoid the obligation to pay most taxes—allowing them to focus
solely on providing services to beneficiaries.48 Second, certain tax-exempt
organizations are permitted to receive tax-deductible contributions.49 This
key fundraising tool is codified separately,50 but it carries essentially the
same criteria as that required for the tax exemption.51 The deduction
feature allows private individuals to pay less income and estate taxes when
they donate, creating a strong incentive to support nonprofits.52 Finally, the
federal tax exemption allows nonprofits to both issue bonds with tax-free
interest, and achieve intangible benefits from an improved public image.53
To receive the federal tax exemption, nonprofits must comply with
section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) to gain approval from the
IRS.54 Under section 501(a),55 nonprofits must be organized and operated
for a specific philanthropic purpose and comply with section 501(c) to
obtain the exemption.56 Specifically, the requirements for charitable or
social service nonprofits57 are defined under section 501(c)(3).58 This
“charitable” purpose that confers exempt status is intended to be divorced
44. The public often confuses the terms “nonprofit” and “tax-exempt,” assuming they
share the same meaning. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit
Organizations: A Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION
AND CONFLICT 142 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999).
45. See BRODY & TYLER, supra note 39, at 17, 20.
46. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT
AND TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2006).
47. See SOROKIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52.
48. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142–44; see also Christyne J. Vachon,
Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care and Loyalty As Nonprofits Move into
Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 37, 39–40 (2011).
49. Elizabeth T. Boris, Nonprofit Organizations in a Democracy: Varied Roles and
Responsibilities, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra
note 44, at 4–5.
50. 26 I.R.C. § 170 (2006).
51. See BRODY & TYLER, supra note 39, at 55.
52. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 143.
53. See Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements, 17 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 487 (2012).
54. See CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 46, at 63.
55. I.R.C. § 501(a).
56. Id. § 501(c).
57. Besides charitable nonprofits, other organizations are capable of receiving the
federal tax exemption and are detailed in the other sections of 501(c). See SOROKIN ET AL.,
supra note 40, at 52 (listing the various tax-exempt organizations).
58. In relevant part, section 501(c)(3) states: “Corporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
(2006).
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from the pursuit of economic benefit for nonprofit founders and financial
contributors.59 To support this legislative scheme on a local level, many
states and municipalities extend tax-exempt status to nonprofits under
criteria identical to the federal standards.60 Most states will extend the
exemption to income and property taxes.61 As a monitoring mechanism,
the IRS requires tax-exempt organizations to annually file a Form 990 to
ensure that nonprofits continue to comply with the exemption
requirements.62
The policy justification for the tax exemption is “based upon the theory
that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from other public funds.”63 In other words, nonprofits are
able to obtain tax-exempt status because they provide the government with
a “public benefit” by providing resources and services the government
would otherwise have to finance with taxpayer money.64 Supplementing
this rationale, there are four prevailing arguments in support of the
government’s tolerance of tax-exempt organizations.65 Each of these
theories is based on the assumption that a nonprofit’s activities will not
confer individual economic wealth.66
2. Private Benefit Implications on the Tax Exemption
Even if a nonprofit has a tax-exempt purpose under section 501(c)(3) and
obtains tax-exempt status, “‘what the government giveth’ it can also take
away.”67 There are certain transactions that can result in intermediate
sanctions68 or a loss of the tax exemption.69 No statute or regulation
59. See Vachon, supra note 48, at 39–40.
60. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS & VIRGINIA C. GROSS, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: LAW,
PRACTICES, AND TRENDS 3 (2009); Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142.
61. See Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 144.
62. See SOROKIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 52.
63. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 590 (1983) (quoting Congressional
Hearings of the Revenue Act of 1938, H.R. Rep. 75-1869, at 19 (1938)).
64. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Doing Well By Doing Good and Vise Versa: SelfSustaining NGO/Nonprofit Organizations, 17. J.L. & POL’Y 403, 411 (2009).
65. The four theories are (1) Hansmann’s contract failure theory, (2) Atkinson’s altruism
theory, (3) Colombo and Hall’s donative theory; and (4) Crimm’s risk compensation theory.
See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 585–86 (2000).
66. See id. at 586. For a further discussion, see generally Rob Atkinson, Theories of the
Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON
L. REV. 395 (1997).
67. Brody & Cordes, supra note 44, at 142.
68. The IRS can apply intermediate sanctions, in the form of penalty fees, to “excess
benefit transactions” involving insiders rather than revoking the tax exemption. See I.R.C.
§ 4958 (2006).
69. To maintain tax-exempt status, a nonprofit must report and pay taxes on unrelated
business income and may not (1) engage in private inurement, (2) confer private benefit, or
(3) participate in a political campaign or lobbying activities. See Gail A. Lasprogata &
Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The Business and Legal Challenges of
Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 76–77 (2003). Put another way, these
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explicitly defines “private benefit”; however, the doctrine is arguably
grounded in Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).70
According to the regulation, a nonprofit has the burden to prove “that it is
not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as
designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the
organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private
interests.”71 If a prohibited private benefit is found, the nonprofit’s taxexempt status may be denied or revoked.72 In fact, private benefit is one of
the most common reasons for revocation of the exemption.73 The IRS can
even apply this doctrine on the speculative belief that private benefit “might
or could occur.”74
The contours of the doctrine have developed over time. Early cases in
the 1970s interpreting the private benefit doctrine confused it with private
inurement75 or failed to recognize it altogether.76 Later, the Tax Court
defined a prohibited private benefit broadly as any “[a]dvantage; profit;
fruit; privilege; gain; [or] interest.”77 These divergent interpretations
underscored the early confusion surrounding the private benefit doctrine up
until the late 1980s.
In 1987, IRS General Counsel Memoranda (GCM) 39,59878 clearly
separated private benefit from private inurement and roughly defined the
requirements can be broken down into four main tests: (1) the Organizational Test; (2) the
Operational Test; (3) the Private Inurement Test; and (4) the Political Activities Test. See
CAFARDI & CHERRY, supra note 46, at 63–84.
70. The private benefit doctrine is derived from Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3),
which states that an organization will not qualify as serving an exempt purposes “unless it
serves a public rather than a private interest.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as
amended in 2008). See Jones, supra note 33, at 998; Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to
Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 746 (2007).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). See, e.g., Basic Bible Church v. Comm’r, 74
T.C. 846, 848 (1985) (illustrating how a nonprofit addressed this issue in its charter).
72. See RUNQUIST, supra note 41, at 70; MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES
INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.1(a) (3d ed. 2007).
73. See RUNQUIST, supra note 41, at 86.
74. See HOPKINS & GROSS, supra note 60, at 17.
75. Private inurement occurs when income or assets from a tax-exempt organization
flow to individuals with direct control over the organization. See Manny, supra note 70, at
744, 746. Private inurement is different from private benefit in three main respects
(1) private inurement only applies to organizational insiders while private benefit applies
also to disinterested persons; (2) private inurement is absolute and will not be excused for an
insignificant amount while private benefit is permissible when incidental; (3) private
inurement can result in the loss of tax-exempt status or intermediate sanctions, while private
benefit may only result in the loss of tax-exempt status. See id. For a broad discussion of the
private inurement doctrine, see generally Jones, supra note 65.
76. See, e.g., Harding Hosp. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974); B.H.W.
Anesthesia Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 681 (1979).
77. Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (1982).
78. In relevant part, the memo reads,
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it serves a private interest
more than incidentally . . . . A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is
incidental in both a qualitative and quantitative sense. In order to be incidental in
a qualitative sense, the benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the activity
which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by
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scope of the doctrine.79 In the GCM, the IRS stated there is a line between
a permissible incidental private benefit and a prohibited private benefit,
dependent upon a weighing of the qualitative and quantitative nature of the
benefit conferred.80
Then, in 1989, the notable American Campaign Academy v.
Commissioner81 case departed from the earlier unclear judicial treatment of
the private benefit doctrine from the 1970s and early 1980s by recognizing
private benefit as a distinct limitation on the federal tax exemption.82 In
American Campaign Academy, the Tax Court essentially adopted the IRS’s
functional test in GCM 39,59883 and noted that courts must examine private
benefit independent from private inurement.84
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United Cancer Council v.
Commissioner85 further clarified the distinction between private inurement
and private benefit. In this case, a tax-exempt charity granted an exclusive
fundraising contract to a for-profit entity, which ended up retaining $26.5
million out of the $28.8 million that it raised.86 The Tax Court upheld the
IRS’s revocation of the nonprofit’s tax-exempt status due to private
inurement.87 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and rejected the
prevailing argument that the private fundraising company should be
considered an “insider” for private inurement purposes, concluding that the
Tax Court should have conducted a private benefit analysis instead.88
Judge Posner penned the decision and noted that “the usual ‘private benefit’
case is one in which the charity has dual public and private goals.”89
However, this decision did little to clarify how the private benefit at issue
should be analyzed.90
The boundaries of the private benefit doctrine remain poorly defined.
Noted nonprofit scholar John Colombo argues that the line between an
incidental and prohibited private benefit remains hazy, describing it as an
benefiting certain private individuals . . . . To be incidental in a quantitative sense,
the private benefit must not be substantial after considering the overall public
benefit conferred by the activity.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
79. See John D. Colombo, Private Benefit: What Is It—and What Do We Want It To
Be? 1, 6–7 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
80. See id.; see also Manny, supra note 70, at 746.
81. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
82. The court denied the exemption through recognition of an impermissible private
benefit, despite an absence of any traditional indicia of private inurement. See id. at 1073–
79; see also Colombo, supra note 79, at 8.
83. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 8.
84. See Archer, supra note 35, at 180–81.
85. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 1174.
87. Id. at 1175.
88. Id. at 1179–80.
89. Id. at 1179.
90. The court left the private benefit determination to remand, but the district court never
addressed the issue because the IRS entered into a settlement to resolve the dispute. See id.;
SANDERS, supra note 72, at 294.
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amorphous “I know it when I see it” test91 that forces charities to “operate
in analytical darkness.”92 Further, since the 1989 decision in American
Campaign Academy, the private benefit doctrine has become the IRS’s
primary tool to “police the activities of charitable organizations under Code
Section 501(c)(3).”93 The IRS’s eagerness to utilize the private benefit
doctrine, coupled with the doctrine’s ambiguity, puts significant pressure on
tax-exempt nonprofits when contemplating transactions with private parties.
There have been several rationales advanced to support the use of the
private benefit doctrine. At a superficial level, the doctrine is very closely
related to the nonprofit prohibition of profit distributions.94 Basic taxexempt nonprofit policy dictates that organizations should operate for a
public benefit rather than a private one in order to justify their exemption.95
One scholar recognizes the evolution of the private benefit doctrine as a
means to ensure that tax-exempt nonprofits remain true to their charitable
purpose and avoid excessive commercialization.96 Tax Professor Darryll
Jones views the private benefit doctrine as a means to “distinguish[]
charitable endeavors from other endeavors not deserving tax-exemption.”97
Professor Colombo argues that the private benefit doctrine is a method to
ensure that nonprofits remain committed to the pursuit of charity and serve
a broad charitable class.98 Renowned economist and nonprofit policy
expert, Burton Weisbrod, suggests that the private benefit doctrine
developed as a means for the IRS to police nonprofits that have become
“for-profits in disguise,” where serving the charitable purpose has become a
secondary goal.99 Judge Posner offered another interpretation in United
Cancer Council, stating that the private benefit doctrine could be used as a
way to guard nonprofits against “bad deals” with for-profit entities.100
Despite these varied policy arguments, they share the common goal of
protecting the nonprofit’s charitable purpose against intrusions from private
interests.

91. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 2.
92. See John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1105
(2006).
93. Colombo, supra note 79, at 1; see Jones, supra note 33, at 984.
94. See Darryll K. Jones, “First Bite” and the Private Benefit Doctrine: A Comment on
Temporary and Proposed Regulation 53.4958-4T(A)(3), 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 715, 718 (2001).
95. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 46.
96. See Vachon, supra note 48, at 37.
97. See Jones, supra note 65, at 615–16.
98. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1081.
99. See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links
Between Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE
COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 11 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed.,
1998) (citation omitted).
100. See Colombo, supra note 79, at 21.
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3. Different Categories of Private Benefit Transactions
As the doctrine has developed, certain interactions with private parties101
can be organized into three general categories of private benefit
transactions: (1) incidental private benefit, (2) likely private benefit, and
(3) joint venture private benefit. Incidental private benefit transactions are
not prohibited and do not destroy the tax exemption.102 The IRS and courts
have also identified certain transactions likely to violate the private benefit
doctrine and have employed an entirely different framework to analyze
private benefit in joint ventures.103
a. Incidental Private Benefit
If a transaction falls within the first category—incidental private
benefit—a nonprofit will not lose its tax-exempt status.104 This inquiry is
guided by the balancing test in GCM 39,598, where the IRS introduced the
dual qualitative and quantitative requirements.105 In the memo, the IRS
explained that “[i]f an activity serves both exempt and nonexempt purposes,
the organization will be exempt only if the predominant motivation
underlying the activity is an exempt purpose.”106 A transaction will be
considered qualitatively incidental if the public benefit cannot be achieved
without necessarily benefiting private individuals.107 The quantitative
prong is satisfied when the private benefit is insubstantial in relation to the
public benefit conferred by the specific activity undertaken, not the overall
public benefit accomplished by the nonprofit.108 Neither the IRS nor the
courts applying this balancing test have announced any bright-line methods
to measure these factors.109
As a result, the IRS has much discretion when utilizing the qualitative
and quantitative balancing test to determine incidental private benefit.110
There are numerous examples of IRS rulings where an incidental private
benefit is either found111 or rejected112 without establishing any clear
101. The list that follows is not exhaustive as the IRS has issued numerous revenue
rulings with varied approaches to the private benefit analysis. The categories discussed
cover the main instances of private benefit identified by scholars.
102. See Manny, supra note 70, at 745–46.
103. See discussion infra Parts I.A.3.b–c.
104. See Archer, supra note 35, at 178.
105. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987).
106. Id.
107. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 281–82.
108. See id. at 45.
109. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 538–40 (discussing the application of the incidental
balancing test).
110. See id. at 540.
111. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 06-06-042 (Feb.
10, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 01-03-083 (Jan. 19, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-15-030
(Apr. 12, 1996).
112. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-206, 1977-1 C.B. 149; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 09-44-053 (Oct.
30, 2009); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 08-49-017 (Dec. 5, 2008).
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guidelines how the qualitative or quantitative prongs were weighed,
essentially “leaving [nonprofits] completely at sea.”113 Since the balancing
test from GCM 39,598 is not a mandatory method to analyze incidental
private benefit, the malleable nature of the doctrine allows the IRS to assess
private benefit in a very pliable manner.114 Accordingly, the IRS has
generously dismissed private benefit as incidental in some circumstances
and aggressively sought tax exemption revocation in others.115
b. Likely Private Benefit
There are certain general nonprofit financial activities that may violate
the private benefit doctrine.
Tax-exempt nonprofits cannot have
stockholders or provide equity distributions like dividends.116 Nonprofits
have more flexibility when it comes to debt instruments.117 Issuing loans
from a nonprofit’s charitable assets to private parties will only result in a
prohibited private benefit if the terms are unreasonable and the loan fails to
further an exempt purpose.118 Also, nonprofits can issue sophisticated taxexempt bonds without violating the private benefit doctrine as long as less
than 10 percent of the proceeds are diverted to noncharitable individual
use.119
Shared revenue stream arrangements between nonprofits and private
entities were identified as a likely violation of the private benefit doctrine in
GCM 39,862.120 The IRS explained that a revenue-sharing agreement
between a tax-exempt hospital and a number of affiliated doctors ran afoul
of the private benefit doctrine.121 The planned arrangement specified that
the hospital would cede control of certain facilities to the doctors in return
for a share of their profits in the hopes of increasing the hospital’s overall
referrals and revenues.122 The hospital’s exemption was revoked since the
private benefit from the shared revenue stream agreement could not be
considered incidental to the concurrent public benefit to the community.123
This decision mirrored older iterations of the private benefit where, despite
the fact that a charitable purpose was served, the benefit to private interests

113. Colombo, supra note 92, at 1065.
114. See Jones, supra note 94, at 724–25 (describing the IRS’s “informal articulation” of
the incidental balancing test).
115. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 540.
116. See id. at 523.
117. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 290.
118. See id.
119. This 10 percent threshold can be higher when the private noncharitable use is
necessary to accomplish a public benefit. See Darryll K. Jones, Restating the Private Benefit
Doctrine for a Brave New World, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 23 (2003).
120. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
121. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 295.
122. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1074.
123. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 295.
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was too great to be considered incidental, and the tax exemption was
forfeited.124
The IRS has also identified circular cash flow arrangements as an
impermissible private benefit. In Revenue Ruling 2006-27, the IRS
analyzed an agreement where a tax-exempt organization received money
from individual home sellers and later used that money to provide down
payment assistance to poor individuals to buy the home sellers’
properties.125 Although the nonprofit served an exempt purpose benefitting
the poor, the IRS found the arrangement violated the private benefit
doctrine in light of the circular cash flow—the money transfer from the
home sellers to the nonprofit to the poor buyers and then back again to the
sellers.126 Professor Colombo has suggested that there must be a deeper
motivation behind Revenue Ruling 2006-27 because there is nothing
inherently wrong when nonprofits act as a “conduit to connect needy
families with housing sellers.”127 Colombo contrasts the perceived
innocence of this transaction with a situation where a nonprofit is used as a
“front” to increase a seller’s market share through exploiting the charitable
class.128
When a private purpose dominates a nonprofit’s operation, the tax
exemption may be revoked despite a coexisting charitable purpose.129
Similar to Professor Weisbrod’s private benefit policy rationale,130 the IRS
may utilize the private benefit doctrine when the tax-exempt purpose
becomes secondary to private interests.131 In American Campaign
Academy, the Tax Court noted that even if a nonprofit serves a valid taxexempt purpose, when there is a substantial “secondary” benefit, the
nonprofit will not qualify as a tax-exempt organization.132 Clarifying this
stance, the court noted that the tax exemption would be lost if secondary
beneficial effects are “earmarked for a particular organization or person.”133
The IRS has established that, when secondary benefits are broadly
distributed to a variety of organizations or individuals, the benefits will be
considered incidental.134 The reciprocal argument holds that if a secondary
benefit is consistently conferred to a single entity it will always be
“substantial” and improper.135 The IRS raised this reciprocal argument in
American Campaign Academy and, while the Tax Court did not accept this
124. See Jones, supra note 33, at 991.
125. See Rev. Rul. 06-27, 06-1 C.B. 915.
126. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1080.
127. See id. at 1096.
128. See id. at 1097.
129. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 281.
130. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
131. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 282–83.
132. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1073–74 (1989).
133. Id. at 1074.
134. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 283 (explaining that the Academy had provided
benefits to a concentrated group of individuals, eventually resulting in the loss of their taxexempt status).
135. See Jones, supra note 33, at 1002.
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proposition, the court has consistently deferred to the IRS following this
case.136
While the courts have not utilized the secondary benefit analysis since
American Campaign Academy, some practitioners have raised concerns that
it could be applied in other situations; however, tax lawyer Michael Sanders
believes this framework will only be utilized on a limited basis in similar
situations.137 Professor Colombo takes a more skeptical stance on
American Campaign Academy, stating the decision simply “makes no
sense,”138 echoing the legal community’s view that the case was decided
incorrectly.139
Aside from the likely private benefit transactions already discussed, the
IRS’s Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(iii) spells out three
examples that would violate the private benefit doctrine.140
The regulation’s first example focuses on the basic question of whether
the charitable class is sufficiently large enough that the nonprofit is
providing a public benefit rather than an impermissible private benefit to
select individuals.141 This form of private benefit closely mirrors the
definition of a “charity,” which requires a nonprofit to provide services that
benefit the community at large.142 This simple charitable class-size inquiry
served as the basis for the private benefit doctrine up until the late 1970s.143
Similar to the 1978 Callaway Family Ass’n v. Commissioner144 decision,
the first example states that an impermissible private benefit would occur
when tax-exempt educational nonprofits primarily serve the private interests
of a single family.145 The courts have applied this concept beyond the
education industry, as the Third Circuit in Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner146 ruled an HMO was not entitled to tax-exempt status,
because it only provided benefits to its members and not the greater
community.147
In the second example, the regulation notes that the private benefit
doctrine would be violated in transactions initiated by nonprofits that result
in grossly disproportionate private commissions.148 Much like the first
136. See id. at 1002 n.112.
137. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 45, 283–84 (“The IRS will most likely limit the
holding in American Campaign Academy, with regard to its application of the secondary
benefit concept, to similar fact patterns.”).
138. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1099.
139. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 283–84.
140. See HOPKINS, supra note 32, at 545 (describing the content and application of the
examples listed in the regulation).
141. See JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS: RULES, CHECKLISTS, PROCEDURES 514 (4th ed. 2004).
142. See Jones, supra note 65, at 615–17.
143. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1069.
144. 71 T.C. 340 (1978).
145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
146. 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
147. See id. at 1219.
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii).
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example, prior precedent served as the basis for this example. In St. Louis
Science Fiction Ltd. v. Commissioner,149 the Tax Court found a tax-exempt
nonprofit was impermissibly operated for private benefit when it paid back
85 percent of the sale price of artwork to the private artists and dealers that
had supplied the products.150 Following closely from this case and a
previous IRS ruling,151 the second regulatory example states a categorical
private benefit would occur if a nonprofit sells artwork to the public and
retains only a 10 percent commission while returning 90 percent of the
value to the individual artists.152
The third example concerns a professional training education program
that violates the private benefit doctrine.153 The example details an
arrangement where a tax-exempt nonprofit’s sole responsibility is to carry
out training exercises while the for-profit entity controls the rights to any
course materials developed and sets the price of tuition.154
While these regulatory examples spell out certain instances where private
benefit definitely occurs, Professor Colombo argues that these three narrow
examples fail to establish the limits of the doctrine and are too varied to
give proper guidance to analyze other types of transactions.155 If one were
to merely read the three examples listed, the problems inherent in equity
distributions, revenue sharing agreements, circular cash flows, and
impermissible secondary benefits are not evident and could be easily
overlooked.156
c. Joint Venture Private Benefit
When nonprofits engage in joint ventures with for-profit entities they will
usually fail the incidental balancing test; however, in this case, the
exemption is not automatically lost because the IRS analyzes the private
benefit under a separate framework.157 While the IRS initially considered
joint ventures with for-profit entities a per se private benefit,158 the
Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner159 decision rejected this
stance160 and served as the basis for later doctrinal development. Although
there was a limited partnership agreement between a nonprofit and a for149. 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1985).
150. See id. at 1128.
151. See Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 151 (denying a tax exemption to an art gallery
engaged in excessive private benefit for transmitting 90 percent of the sale price to a small
number of artists).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii).
153. See id.
154. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1104.
155. See id. at 1065.
156. While the preceding list of transactions that are likely to result in private benefit is
not exhaustive, it does illustrate the broad reach of the doctrine.
157. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1078.
158. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control! Why the IRS Should Change Its Stance
on Exempt Organizations in Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 35–36 (2006).
159. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
160. Id. at 1330–31.
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profit corporation in Plumstead, the court ruled that there was no private
benefit violation since the for-profit entity was paid a reasonable price and
had no control over the tax-exempt nonprofit.161 The decision forced the
IRS to accept the principle that joint ventures between private parties and
Since
tax-exempt nonprofits are compatible in some instances.162
Plumstead, the IRS has adopted a cautious approach where it “closely
scrutinizes” situations where a nonprofit participates in a partnership or
joint venture with a for-profit entity.163
In GCM 39,005, the IRS established a two part test to determine private
benefit in joint ventures by examining (1) whether the objective of the joint
venture serves or furthers the exempt organization’s charitable purpose, and
(2) if the partnership allows the tax exempt organization to act exclusively
for their exempt purpose and not for the benefit of the for-profit partners.164
Essentially, this memo introduced another functional test to determine
whether a prohibited private benefit occurs in joint ventures with for-profit
entities by comparing the public benefits with the private benefits that
individual investors accumulate.165 However, in the late 1990s, the twopart private benefit analysis from GCM 39,005 was partially abandoned in
favor of different standards for whole-entity joint ventures and ancillary
joint ventures.166
In the context of whole-entity joint ventures—where a nonprofit commits
all of its assets to a joint venture with a for-profit entity—the issue of
whether nonprofits could retain their exemption was addressed in Revenue
Ruling 98-15.167 In the ruling, the IRS added an additional factor to the
original two-part test, stating the private benefit determination depends on
an analysis of whether (1) a charitable purpose is being served, (2) the
nonprofit is able to act exclusively in furtherance of the charitable purpose
and not for the benefit of the for-profit parties, and (3) the nonprofit
maintains control over the joint venture’s management.168
Embracing the Revenue Ruling 98-15 analysis, the Tax Court in
Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner169 roughly adopted the IRS’s
position.170 In Redlands, the court upheld the IRS’s decision to deny the
exemption due to the occurrence of an impermissible private benefit.171
Specifically, the court noted how the tax-exempt nonprofit had “ceded
effective control” over the joint venture, resulting in a significant private
benefit to the for-profit partners who were able to put personal gains ahead
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See id. at 1333–34.
See Jones, supra note 33, at 992.
See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 291–92.
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
See Colombo, supra note 79, at 6–7.
See id. at 12–13.
See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 14.
See id. at 14–16; Mirkay, supra note 158, at 23, 42.
113 T.C. 47 (1999).
See Archer, supra note 35, at 183.
See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 78.
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of charitable purposes.172 While the lack of control in Redlands was
dispositive and resulted in the revocation of the exemption, the court stated
that it did not “view [this] one factor as crucial.”173 The Fifth Circuit in St.
David’s Health Care System v. United States174 took a narrower view
focused on the control prong, deciding that a per se private benefit occurs
when a tax-exempt nonprofit lacks majority voting control in a joint venture
with a for-profit entity.175 Both of these decisions indicate that the courts
have accepted the IRS’s expansion of the private benefit doctrine beyond
GCM 39,005 and adopted the Revenue Ruling 98-15 framework, which
includes the control factor.176
The IRS further refined its private benefit analysis for nonprofit joint
ventures with private entities in Revenue Ruling 2004-51.177 Apart from
the whole-entity joint venture analysis, the IRS introduced a different
approach for ancillary joint ventures—where nonprofit involvement may be
significant but falls short of requiring total asset contribution.178 In the
ruling, the IRS determined that a tax-exempt university engaging in a joint
venture with a for-profit company to provide supplemental educational
services would not lose its exemption because the school’s participation
only constituted an insubstantial portion of its activities.179 This decision
suggests that ancillary joint ventures are distinct from whole-entity joint
ventures and typically will not endanger the federal tax exemption when the
enterprise does not constitute a substantial part of a nonprofit’s activities.180
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 has also been interpreted to dispose of the
control requirement for ancillary joint ventures, an important distinction
versus whole-entity joint ventures.181 Despite this, doubts remain over the
precedential value of this ruling.182 Notably, the IRS did not explicitly use
the private benefit doctrine in Revenue Ruling 2004-51’s exemption
analysis, although it was clearly at issue.183 This inconsistency has been
debated among legal academics, leading to divergent explanations.184 Tax
Professor Nicholas Mirkay embraces a straightforward interpretation,
arguing that the IRS is not concerned with joint venture control when
participation is only a minor part of a nonprofit’s activities.185 Professor
Colombo offers a slightly more complex interpretation, stating that the
control analysis is relaxed when nonprofits retain control over the charitable
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 45.
See Redlands, 113 T.C. at 92.
349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 48.
See id. at 48–49.
Rev. Rul. 04-51, 04-1 C.B. 974, 975.
See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 26.
See Rev. Rul. 04-51, 04-1 C.B. 974, 975–76.
See id.
See id.; SANDERS, supra note 72, at 16–17.
See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 23–24.
See Archer, supra note 35, at 184.
See id. at 185.
See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 25–26.
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portions of the joint venture.186 However, the ancillary joint venture private
benefit analysis remains mainly speculative, as it appears the IRS was
attempting to avoid establishing a clear precedent in Revenue Ruling 200451.187
In sum, when nonprofits engage in joint ventures with for-profit entities,
they can expect the IRS will closely scrutinize the arrangement.188 Despite
this, the different approaches to analyze whole-entity and ancillary joint
ventures both allow some nonprofits to retain their exemption when private
interests do not dominate the charitable purpose.
B. Social Impact Bonds and the Relationships Between the
Private Investors, the Government, and the Nonprofits
This section will provide an overview of the prevailing SIB framework.
After it details the mechanics of how SIBs are designed to operate, the
section will discuss each participant’s various benefits and risks.
1. Social Impact Bond Overview
A SIB189 is a new financing mechanism190 where nonprofits are able to
scale-up their operations through funding provided by private investors who
stand to make a return—paid out by the government—if the nonprofits’
outreach work successfully accomplishes predetermined benchmarks.191 In
the prevailing model,192 a SIB is an arrangement between private investors,
social service nonprofits, government administrators, and an independent
assessor.193 Under a SIB agreement, nonprofits receive a long-term funding
commitment to implement or expand a social program capable of delivering
large, quantifiable savings to a local, state, or federal government
agency.194 Private investors provide the money to support the program by

186. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1079 n.81.
187. See id. at 1079; Mirkay, supra note 158, at 59.
188. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
189. Some government administrators refer to SIBs and “pay for success” contracts
interchangeably, but these two terms have developed slightly different meanings. See KOHLI
ET AL., supra note 10, at 2 (comparing and contrasting pay for success contracts and SIBs);
MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 19 (differentiating SIBs from pay for success contracts).
190. Use of the term “social impact bond” is somewhat of a misnomer since a SIB is not a
bond in the conventional sense of the term; rather it is a series of contracts between the
investors, nonprofits, and government. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 5; MCKINSEY
REPORT, supra note 2, at 12–13. For a sample of what draft language could look like in a
conventional bond, see JITINDER KOHLI ET AL., INSIDE A SOCIAL IMPACT BOND AGREEMENT:
EXPLORING THE CONTRACT CHALLENGES OF A NEW SOCIAL FINANCE MECHANISM 3–19
(2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/05/
pdf/sib_agreement_brief.pdf.
191. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
192. The Peterborough SIB and the Rikers Island SIB share a similar structure. See Chen,
supra note 8. However, there are proposals for other methods of arranging SIBs. See COSTA
ET AL., supra note 22, at 10–11.
193. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 14–16.
194. See id.
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allowing nonprofits to draw down funds throughout the term of the SIB.195
In turn, the participating government agency agrees to repay the investors,
plus a variable interest if the preselected benchmarks, monitored by an
independent assessor, are fulfilled by the end of the SIB term.196 If the
program falls short of the benchmarks, the investors lose their money, but
the government escapes with no financial penalty, avoiding costs on the
taxpayers.197 If the program is successful, the government saves money,
investors make money, and the charitable class benefits from the expansion
of nonprofit operations and implementation of the SIB.198 At the
conclusion of the SIB, the government may continue to support the
participating nonprofits by either funding them directly or executing
another SIB.199
The first ever SIB was developed for the Peterborough Prison in the
United Kingdom and was established in a September 2010 agreement
between a collection of philanthropic investors,200 four U.K. nonprofits led
by Social Finance,201 and the U.K. Justice Ministry.202 The investors
provided roughly $8 million203 in funding to implement a program designed
to help former inmates adapt to life after confinement.204 If the nonprofits
are able to reduce the recidivism rates of Peterborough’s former short-term
prisoners, the investors will be repaid their initial investment plus up to 13
percent interest.205 While the term ends in 2018 and the data will not be
partially analyzed until 2014,206 the Peterborough SIB was seen as a good
template for replication in the United States.207 This proved true two years
later in the similarly structured Rikers Island SIB.208
SIBs “flip [the] traditional government funding structures [for nonprofits]
on their head,” allowing the government to only commit funds to successful
social programs, instead of paying nonprofits upfront, regardless of the
outcome.209 This presents an entirely new method for the government to
support nonprofits without excessive risk to taxpayers. Investors bear the
195. See id.
196. See id.; Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 2.
197. See Caroline Preston, Getting Back More Than a Warm Feeling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2012, at F1.
198. See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 11.
199. See id. at 13.
200. The main investors in the Peterborough SIB were the Rockefeller Foundation, the
Barrow Cadbury Charitable Trust, and the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation. See id. at 9.
201. The participating nonprofits in the Peterborough SIB were St. Giles Trust, Ormiston
Trust, the YMCA, and Supporting Others Through Volunteer Action. See MCKINSEY
REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
202. See LIEBMAN, supra note 24, at 13.
203. The investors provided £5 million, which roughly equates to $8 million. See von
Glahn & Whistler, supra note 23, at 59.
204. See id. at 60.
205. See id. at 61.
206. See LIEBMAN, supra note 24, at 13–14.
207. See von Glahn & Whistler, supra note 23, at 61.
208. See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text.
209. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
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chief financial risk when implementing a SIB, while the government is only
required to commit funds when public savings have been achieved from the
successful completion of the desired SIB outcomes.210 SIBs are clearly
distinguishable from the conventional sources of nonprofit funding, such as
when the government provides grants to or contracts directly with
nonprofits to provide services to desired communities.211 While the SIB
concept is still in its infancy, and it is unclear how well they will work and
how widely they will be implemented, SIBs offer strong incentives to each
of the three main participants—investors, government agencies, and
nonprofits.212
2. The Participants
This section will examine the likely SIB participants and the inherent
benefits and risks associated with entering into a SIB.
a. Investors
Initially, the investors who are likely to provide the capital in SIBs are
either philanthropic investors or private investors willing to take a higher
level of risk at below market returns.213 Interested investors should also
have a high risk tolerance and interest in social benefit instead of pure
financial returns214 because SIBs essentially carry “equity-like risk with
bond-like returns.”215 Some have taken an optimistic outlook on SIBs, as
the head of global wealth and retirement solutions at Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, Andrew Seig, stated, “I’m very bullish about the concept of
social impact bonds.”216 Also, risk can be hedged in SIBs through the use
of a guarantee similar to the one utilized in the Rikers Island SIB.217 On the
other hand, with no clear revenue streams to support a SIB, some investors
will be hesitant to participate until the model becomes more standardized
and proves to be a worthwhile bet.218
Financing a SIB offers an attractive blended investment—allowing
investors to achieve a meaningful social impact and net financial returns.219
Even if the SIB fails to reach its minimum targets, investors will have
210. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
211. See Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity, in
NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT, supra note 44, at 181–82.
212. MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
213. See id. at 9, 39.
214. See id. at 39.
215. See LIEBMAN, supra note 24, at 28.
216. See Preston, supra note 197.
217. Goldman Sachs is the private investor in the Rikers Island SIB and is protected with
a guarantee from Bloomberg Philanthropies that significantly limits its downside risk. See
supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.
218. Discussing the potential future of SIBs, former wealth manager Ron Cordes noted,
“Putting my investor hat on, what we need now is a number of pilots that demonstrate they
work.” See Preston, supra note 197.
219. See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 11; Preston, supra note 197.
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contributed funds in a philanthropic manner to support social projects
aimed to improve the lives of vulnerable individuals.220 Such giving could
result in positive externalities in light of studies that have suggested
corporate social responsibility contributions end up conferring a beneficial
effect on bottom-line profits from normal operations.221 Goldman Sachs
has publicly stated that it views the participation in the Rikers Island SIB as
an investment;222 however, they have also received much positive press as a
result of the SIB and commentators have noted the potential publicity
benefits from participation.223
There are also several downsides facing potential investors in SIBs.
Since the financial risk of funding nonprofits shifts from the government to
the investors in SIBs, the investors remain exposed to a major loss if the
SIB fails.224 By virtue of the conventional SIB structure, investors stand to
lose their entire capital contribution if the nonprofits do not reach the preset
benchmarks.225 Investors can approach this risk in two manners. First, if
the SIB investment fails, it could simply be written off as a loss, yet
participation would still have a positive reputational impact akin to
conventional philanthropic giving.226 Alternatively, at the outset, investors
could seek to add a guarantor, limiting their downside to only a portion of
their overall SIB investment.227
b. Government
SIBs are an option for federal, state, or local government
administrators.228 However, since most social service programs in the
United States are funded at the state and local level, it is more likely that
city and state governments will implement SIBs.229 To get SIBs off the
ground, strong executive leadership from a government official is noted as a
key component.230 For example, Mayor Bloomberg championed the Rikers
220. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 15, 18.
221. See BARUCH LEV ET AL., MAKING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR CORPORATE
PHILANTHROPY 2–4 (2011) (describing how corporate philanthropy can be a valuable
business activity). But see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (claiming that corporate social
responsibility expenditures would be met with disapproval from stockholders and result in
lower profits).
222. Alicia Glen, a managing director at Goldman Sachs, has stated that the company’s
participation in the Rikers Island SIB is viewed as a “double bottom line investment where
the firm expects a blended social and financial return.” See Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 11.
223. See Kavner, supra note 1.
224. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
226. See Badawy, supra note 29.
227. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
228. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
229. See LIEBMAN, supra note 24, at 5.
230. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 35; Presentation, Social Fin. Dir. Lisa
Barclay, Developing a Social Impact Bond 14 (2012), http://www.socialfinance.org.uk/sites/
default/files/bristol_conference_-_developing_a_sibvfinal.pdf
[hereinafter
Barclay
Presentation].
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Island SIB and also leveraged his own nonprofit to guarantee a large
portion of the investment at risk.231 Likewise, Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick has publicly supported SIBs and is in the process of arranging
several for the state.232
As previously mentioned, SIBs provide a notable advantage to the
government—eliminating responsibility for the financial risk in funding
nonprofits.233 If the benchmarks for measuring government savings are
properly measured and the interest premiums are properly structured, the
government agency will never spend more than it saves when participating
in a SIB.234 If the SIB fails, the government would be cash neutral, as they
would not be obligated to repay the investors.235 If the SIB succeeds, the
government would only provide the investors a portion of the savings
achieved by the social work.236 This is especially valuable during periods
of fiscal constraint, where nonprofit funding might otherwise be cut
altogether.237
SIBs allow the government to transition from supporting remedial
programs to less costly preventive solutions,238 such as the programs
designed to reduce recidivism rates. The government’s taxpayers also
benefit from SIBs since private investors provide capital for social
programs, which the government might have otherwise paid for itself.239
Further tax savings would occur if the preventive programs financed by the
SIBs allow the government to reduce their obligations, such as closing
unused portions of a prison.240
While SIBs present a number of benefits to the government, there are
some issues that must be considered prior to agreeing to a SIB. The most
difficult aspect of forming a SIB is to properly define measureable
outcomes that will translate into tangible savings—a primary incentive for
government participation.241 While a SIB is intended to avoid saddling the
government with a net loss, the government agency may end up with an
opportunity cost: paying more than it would in a conventional nonprofit
service contract.242 The diffuse benefit problem has been identified as
another issue—where it may be difficult for a government agency to
231. See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text (detailing the Rikers Island SIB and
the role played by Bloomberg Philanthropies).
232. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13.
233. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 3; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
234. See Barclay Presentation, supra note 230, at 6.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 3.
238. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 17–18.
239. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 10; see also Bucholtz, supra note 64, at 409
(discussing the effects of government cutbacks on social service funding).
240. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 18.
241. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.
242. Overall, SIBs are more expensive because the private investors must be paid a
premium if the SIB is successful and there may be additional management fees. See Barclay
Presentation, supra note 230, at 6.
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determine realized cash savings because the benefits of a SIB may accrue to
multiple levels of government, not just the participant.243 This diffuse
benefit problem becomes more of an issue for programs serving
underprivileged groups, such as the homeless, where the federal, state, and
local governments often share funding responsibilities.244 Lastly, some
government officials have expressed concern that participation could lead to
a public backlash, viewing the arrangement as a way to give government
savings away to wealthy investors.245
c. Nonprofits
The nonprofits selected to provide services in SIBs are likely to be those
that have previously qualified for government contracts.246 Investors will
favor providing capital to nonprofits with a strong reputation or those with
an easily traceable program in place, since unproven intervention programs
carry additional risk.247 SIBs are well tailored to benefit nonprofits with a
proven track record by allowing them to significantly scale-up their
operations by providing access to a secure source of long-term funding.248
Fundraising is crucial to the viability of many nonprofits.249 Nonprofits
face the chronic problem of finding new and consistent sources of revenue
beyond private and governmental donors.250 Further exacerbating this
challenge, traditional sources of funding251 for nonprofits have been in
decline for the past two decades.252 Private donations, as a percentage of
total nonprofit revenue, have decreased since the late 1970s, and donations
have failed to keep pace with inflation for some human service
nonprofits.253 Despite cuts in government spending and declines in
philanthropic donations since the 2008 financial crisis, the number of
nonprofits created has continued to grow, which further constricts funding
options in the industry.254 As a result of this decreased federal spending
and increased competition for public and private donations, nonprofits have
been encouraged to find new sources of financing.255 These economic and
political developments have forced nonprofits to become more
entrepreneurial, resorting to increased commercial operations or even
243. See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 8.
244. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 9.
247. See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 17.
248. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8; SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 4.
249. See SOROKIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 53.
250. See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 22.
251. Traditional sources of funding for social service nonprofits include government
grants, private donations, and fees for service. See Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 69, at
68.
252. Id. at 71.
253. See Smith, supra note 211, at 193.
254. See Diane L. Fahey, Taxing Nonprofits Out of Business, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
547, 547 (2005); Vachon, supra note 48, at 41.
255. See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 7; Smith, supra note 211, at 184–85.
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considering entering into joint ventures with private corporations.256 While
these entrepreneurial possibilities have broadened nonprofit funding
options, it places nonprofits at risk of incurring federal tax liability257 or
losing their tax-exempt status.258
SIBs have introduced a new and exciting source of entrepreneurial
funding that could mark a revolution in the way nonprofits are financed.259
Nonprofits that participate in SIBs gain access to a consistent source of
funding throughout the term of the program, without fear of potential
interruptions such as governmental budget cuts.260 Further, if the SIB is
successful, the managing nonprofit potentially stands to gain a share of the
governmental savings, depending on how the SIB is structured.261 Aside
from the potential loss of compensation262 and reputational damage263 when
a nonprofit fails to meet the SIB benchmarks, nonprofit participation carries
a far more serious risk—the potential loss of tax-exempt status.264
II. HOW NONPROFITS PARTICIPATING IN SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS MAY
VIOLATE THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE
This part discusses the potential clash between the profits paid to
investors in SIBs and the private benefit doctrine. Part II.A discusses the
specifics of how the private benefit doctrine could be an issue for nonprofits
participating in SIBs. Parts II.B–D then analyze how the private benefit
issue in SIBs compares with the different categories of private benefit
identified in Part I.A.3. Lastly, Part II.E offers some conclusions from the
preceding analysis.
A. The Inherent Private Benefit Problem in Social Impact Bonds
Professor Colombo recently stated, “I fear the IRS sees every innovative
deal between an exempt charity and some third party outside the charitable

256. See Lasprogata & Cotton, supra note 69, at 69.
257. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.513, a tax-exempt nonprofit will be forced to
pay an unrelated business income tax (UBIT) for regularly carried on activities that produce
income but are not substantially related to the nonprofits tax-exempt purpose. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.513-1 (1967).
258. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the private inurement and private benefit doctrines).
259. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 7–8.
260. See Bloomberg Presentation, supra note 12, at 3.
261. See Kathi Jaworski, “Pay for Success” Experiment Launches in Massachusetts,
NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/management/20806-payfor-success-experiment-launches-in-massachusetts.html.
262. See id.
263. If a SIB is unsuccessful, the participating nonprofits may be perceived as ineffective
and face difficulties when trying to raise donations in the future. See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra
note 21, at 22.
264. While this issue will be examined throughout Part II, tax-exempt nonprofits are
prohibited from paying out “profits” to private parties. This principle, referred to as the
“non-distribution constraint,” is the line that separates nonprofits from for-profits. See Henry
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
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class as an issue of private benefit.”265 In fact, most of the private benefit
cases occur when nonprofits enter contractual relationships with for-profits
that confer economic benefits to the for-profit organization.266 For
participating nonprofits, SIBs are not a simple, no-strings-attached source
of funding, considering that the investors agree to provide financing
conditioned on the expectation of positive returns on the project.267
The question that arises in the context of SIBs is whether or not the
investor’s returns, which derive from the successful work of nonprofits in
the SIB, equate to a distribution of profits akin to other transactions that
result in an impermissible private benefit. It seems similar to what Judge
Posner described as “the usual ‘private benefit’ case . . . in which the
charity has dual public and private goals.”268 In light of this uncertainty,
participating in a SIB may place nonprofits in an uncomfortable position. If
a nonprofit accepts, it might lose its tax-exempt status. If a nonprofit
declines, it would be turning down a major source of funding that would
allow the organization to impact far more lives and obtain greater
recognition.
To gain a better idea of how engaging in SIBs may result in a prohibited
private benefit, the following sections compare the effect of participating in
a SIB with the various forms of private benefit discussed in Part I.A.3. It is
unclear whether only successful SIBs would raise private benefit concerns,
since if the benchmarks are not met at the end of the SIB term, the private
investors would lose their investment and incur a loss.269 If the IRS adopts
an ex ante approach to analyze the private benefit, examining the SIB’s
prospective value and initial expected payout, it is less likely that there
would be an impermissible private benefit.270 Even if the IRS uses the
more restrictive ex post analysis—focusing retrospectively on the interest
paid in successful SIBs—it is debatable whether these investor “profits”
would violate the private benefit doctrine. There is a strong argument that
the profits which investors stand to earn in SIBs are entirely divorced from
private benefit concerns since the profits flow from governmental savings
rather than directly from nonprofit operations.271 Only if we are to believe
that the “profits” occurring in SIBs are similar enough to direct payments
from nonprofits to third parties does the private benefit issue persist.
Considering these arguments to the contrary, while it may be difficult for
265. Colombo, supra note 79, at 17 n.64.
266. See id. at 23.
267. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 12–13.
268. See United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999); see
also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
269. As noted in Part I.B, in unsuccessful SIBs, the private investors lose their loaned
principal and any potential interest as they have taken on the risk of the charitable work. If
this occurs, there is no ex post private benefit issue since the private investors realize a net
loss rather than profiting.
270. Using an ex ante approach would lead to a lower probability that there would be a
significant private benefit sufficient to satisfy the quantitative prong of the balancing test.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
271. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 13 (illustrating the money flows in a SIB).
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the IRS to determine that SIB participation would violate the private benefit
doctrine, they could conceivably analyze the issue in the following manner.
B. Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Incidental
Private Benefit Transactions
To begin the private benefit analysis, the SIB structure should be
measured against the balancing test to determine whether the potential
investor profits should be considered incidental.272 Since the IRS has
acknowledged that tax-exempt nonprofits may generate incidental private
benefits and retain their exemption, the balancing test offers a threshold
determination that can eliminate the need for further private benefit
analysis.273 Although the balancing test remains shrouded in ambiguity,274
assessing SIBs within the framework could be illustrative of how the IRS
would view the private benefit issue.
To pass the qualitative incidental benefit prong, the private benefit
occurring must be necessary to achieve a charitable public benefit.275 SIBs
seem to satisfy this requirement. In SIBs, the private benefit, in the form of
profits to private investors, is tied directly to the success of the participating
nonprofits’ ability to serve a charitable class likely to result in governmental
savings.276 The expansion of nonprofit capabilities from SIB funding
allows nonprofits to either provide their services to more individuals or
better serve their existing constituency.277 This rapid growth is often not
possible through the traditional sources of nonprofit funding, underscoring
the necessity of SIB participation to make a greater impact.278 It is highly
likely that SIBs would pass the qualitative prong since the economic
realities and fundraising difficulties facing nonprofits make participation
necessary to achieve a greater public benefit.279
The quantitative prong dictates that an incidental private benefit must be
“insubstantial” in comparison with the overall public benefit achieved by
the activity.280 This requirement is difficult to interpret since the IRS has
avoided utilizing a consistent method to analyze this prong.281 While the
IRS has not clearly defined what level of private benefit in excess of public

272. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text (defining the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the balancing test).
273. See Archer, supra note 35, at 196.
274. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1065.
275. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); see also FRANCES R. HILL &
DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 4.02[2] (2003).
276. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (detailing the increased competition
over conventional sources of funding in the nonprofit industry).
280. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); see also HILL & MANCINO,
supra note 275, ¶ 4.02[2].
281. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 275, ¶ 4.02[2].
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benefit would qualify as “insubstantial,” the interest paid in SIBs could
arguably be construed either way.
In SIBs, it is relatively simple to measure the amount of private benefit
that occurs. Successful SIBs will repay investors their initial investment
that financed the nonprofit’s social program and distribute a variable rate of
return depending on how successful the program was at accomplishing its
goals.282
Valuing the public good, however, is much more challenging as it leaves
room for interpretation. If the IRS adopts a narrow interpretation of the
public good—only considering the government’s cost savings from the
SIB’s success—SIBs are more likely to fail the quantitative prong, since a
sizable portion of the savings are passed along to pay the investors their
investment principal and variable interest.283 Using this narrow perspective
of the public good, it would be very difficult to categorize the private
benefit as “insubstantial” in comparison with the public benefit. On the
other hand, if the IRS uses a broader approach to determine public good,
nonprofits could make a strong claim that the resulting private benefit in
SIBs is “insubstantial” in comparison with the public benefit. Beyond the
mere public benefit from governmental savings, successful SIBs will have
delivered substantial intangible benefits to the charitable class served by the
nonprofits. It is difficult to value the intangible benefits on a social level
when SIBs help individuals to avoid reincarceration and recidivism.284
However, if the IRS uses this broader view of the resulting public benefit, it
is very likely that SIBs would satisfy the quantitative test.
While SIBs seemingly qualify as both qualitatively and quantitatively
incidental, there are no guarantees the IRS will agree with this
interpretation. After all, the IRS has proven to inconsistently apply the
private benefit doctrine and the incidental two-prong test from GCM 39,598
is not binding.285
C. Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Likely
Private Benefit Transactions
Beyond the incidental balancing test, the IRS could try to analogize SIB
participation to other activities that have resulted in a prohibited private
benefit. These past examples of private benefit identified in Part I.A.3.b
exhibit some commonalities with SIBs.
The private profits in SIBs resemble the payments associated with both
nonprofit debt financing and equity distributions. While a tax-exempt
nonprofit may borrow money from private lenders to finance their
282. See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text.
283. For example, the government officials in the Rikers Island SIB have quantified the
possible savings and premium payment that may occur if the SIB is successful. At most, the
government will end up saving 22 percent in excess of the repaid principal and interest to the
private investors. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13.
284. This kind of sociological valuation analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
285. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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activities, they may not distribute profits as a return on capital to private
individuals.286 Nonprofit debt instruments will not automatically violate
the private benefit doctrine,287 while equity distributions will.288 Although
called a “bond,” SIBs are more of a debt-equity hybrid that is not backed by
hard assets or cash.289 SIBs resemble debt due to their fixed term and
capped maximum return; however, like equity, the returns will vary
depending on the nonprofits’ performance.290 This ambiguity underscores
the difficulty in claiming that the private profits in SIBs are more similar to
the permissible payouts in tax-exempt bonds or the prohibited dividends in
an equity arrangement. As a result, any insights from this comparison seem
inconclusive to the overarching question whether SIBs would violate the
private benefit doctrine.
At first blush, the profits in SIBs appear similar to a shared revenue
stream agreement. Much like the prohibited shared revenue streams, certain
SIBs allow managing nonprofits to “share” in the governmental savings
with private investors as they both stand to receive a payout if the
benchmarks are met.291 In GCM 39,862, the IRS struck down a shared
revenue agreement where a nonprofit essentially outsourced some of its
work to private individuals in return for a portion of their earnings.292 The
shared payout possible in SIBs is far different from the arrangement at issue
in GCM 39,862. First, the participating nonprofits scale-up their operations
to develop comprehensive treatment programs rather than passing off
responsibilities to private parties.293 Second, the profits that private
investors may achieve in SIBs occur in a one-off discrete payment from the
government,294 not as a continuing share of revenues as was the case in
GCM 39,862.295 Most importantly, SIBs do not directly generate revenues;
rather, they generate governmental savings through programs designed to
reduce recidivism or homelessness.296 Given these differences, it is very
difficult to analogize the private benefit transaction exemplified in GCM
39,862 to SIBs.
SIBs also superficially resemble impermissible circular cash flow
arrangements to an extent. Much like Revenue Ruling 2006-27,297 the
private investors in SIBs provide money to directly help the charitable class
and later stand to reap the benefit from the class’s improved social
outcomes.298 However, SIBs are not a true circular cash flow arrangement.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See BLAZEK, supra note 141, at 11.
See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 14.
Id.
See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1074.
See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, 7–9.
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 4, 15.
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
See KOHLI ET AL., supra note 10, at 4, 7–8.
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While the private investors do front the money to the nonprofits in SIBs,299
the nonprofits do not merely act as a conduit to transfer money to the
charitable class.300 Instead, SIBs use the money provided by the private
investors to implement a comprehensive program designed to achieve
socially beneficial outcomes aimed at improving their constituents’ lives.301
The profits occur indirectly, from eventual governmental savings,302 rather
than directly from the nonprofit’s operations as in Revenue Ruling 2006-27.
Unlike a circular cash flow arrangement, the charitable class in SIBs does
not receive money from the private investors—they receive the benefits of
the investment through improved treatment and outreach programs
provided by the nonprofits.303 SIBs clearly do not result in a private benefit
like the agreement in Revenue Ruling 2006-27.
If the IRS seeks to use the broad conceptualization of private benefit
doctrine from American Campaign Academy, SIB participation could
endanger the tax exemption. In American Campaign Academy, the court
noted that a secondary benefit would be impermissible if it is “earmarked
for a particular organization,” rather than broadly distributed among an
industry.304 SIBs seem to run afoul of this formulation, since the private
investors are singled out to receive a variable rate of return if the program
successfully meets its preset performance targets.305 Before concluding that
SIBs will always result in an impermissible private benefit, it is important
to note that American Campaign Academy is recognized as a highly
questionable decision that has not been relied upon in subsequent cases.306
Also, the legal community has widely disregarded the decision as improper
and carrying little precedential value.307 While the private benefit
definition from American Campaign Academy seems to present a major
issue for nonprofits participating in SIBs, the skepticism over the integrity
of the doctrine suggests it may not be utilized again.
None of the three examples of private benefit enumerated in Treasury
Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(iii) would reasonably apply to SIBs.
The first example found a private benefit when the charitable class was
insufficiently small.308 It is highly unlikely that nonprofits participating in
SIBs will serve an insufficiently small charitable class. SIBs are designed
to introduce or scale-up current charitable programs to serve a constituency
large enough to result in meaningful government savings.309 Considering

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 13.
Cf. supra text accompanying note 127.
See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 11–12.
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
See Rosenberg, supra note 10.
See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1074 (1989).
See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 12.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
See supra Part I.B.
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the complexity and costs inherent in the SIB structure,310 it would not be
feasible to merely benefit a small group of people as those in the first
regulatory example. SIBs also do not match up with the second regulatory
example, which resulted in a clearly disproportionate commission to private
parties without serving meaningful charitable goals.311 This does not occur
in SIBs, which will only pay private investors a portion of governmental
savings if the charitable class is properly served by the nonprofit.312 Lastly,
example three, which details the retention of assets in a professional
training agreement between a nonprofit and a for-profit entity,313 is simply
not applicable to SIBs. While the regulatory examples clearly describe
three transactions that violate the private benefit doctrine, none of them are
similar enough to the profits paid in SIBs to provide meaningful assistance
in this analysis.
In conclusion, the various forms of likely private benefit discussed fail to
clearly address the SIB private benefit issue. The superficial similarities in
shared revenue streams and circular cash flow arrangement lack depth, the
broad American Campaign Academy interpretation lacks support, and the
regulatory examples altogether fail to capture the essence of the potential
issues in the SIB’s payout structure.
D. Comparison of Social Impact Bonds with Joint Venture
Private Benefit Transactions
The separate private benefit framework utilized by the IRS when
nonprofits enter into joint ventures with private parties may provide further
guidance to analyze the private benefit issue in SIBs.
Yet, before approaching the private benefit question, it is important to
determine if SIBs are similar enough to joint ventures to warrant
comparison. A joint venture can be implied even when the cooperating
parties fail to explicitly recognize their arrangement as such.314 While SIBs
do not precisely fit the tax law definition of a joint venture,315 there are
several resemblances between the two. Joint ventures are enterprises
between parties with (1) a shared interest in a common purpose, (2) a shared
interest in the subject matter, (3) shared control over policy, and (4) shared
profits.316
310. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 12, 16.
311. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
312. For example, investors in the Peterborough SIB and Rikers Island SIB are only paid
when recidivism is successfully lowered—benefitting the former prisoners and assisting their
reintegration into society. See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.
313. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iii).
314. See Jones, supra note 65, at 620–21.
315. For tax purposes, a joint venture requires the presence of four factors: (1) express or
implied agreement between the parties to establish a business venture, (2) joint control and
proprietorship, (3) mutual contribution of assets to the venture, and (4) shared profits. See id.
at 623.
316. See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 25 (citing Harlen E. Moore Charitable Trust v.
United States, 812 F. Supp. 130, 132 (C.D. Ill.), aff’d, 9 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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The first factor appears to be met in SIBs because the private investors
and nonprofits share the same purpose of successfully providing charitable
services, which will eventually lead to profits for the private investor.317
The second factor is also plausibly satisfied in SIBs. Although the subject
matter in SIBs—serving a charitable class—may be of more interest to the
nonprofits, for-profit entities have previously demonstrated an interest in
social responsibility.318 In terms of the third factor, private investors do not
directly share control with nonprofits in SIBs. Investors usually will have
little say in how the nonprofits should fulfill the SIB, although they may
exert some control over which nonprofits are chosen to fulfill the SIB.319
Lastly, the final factor of shared profits could be met in SIBs that extend a
performance bonus to the managing nonprofit in addition to paying
investors when successful.320 Much like joint ventures between private
parties and nonprofits, participation in a SIB would allow a nonprofit to
further its exempt purposes, diversify its sources of revenue, and obtain
needed capital in an increasingly competitive environment.321 While the
SIB model does not exactly mirror that of joint ventures, the appearance is
similar enough to warrant consideration of the accompanying private
benefit analysis.
Following the whole-entity joint venture framework established in
Revenue Ruling 98-15 and Redlands, the IRS uses a three-factor test to
determine when nonprofits may preserve their exemption even when some
private benefit occurs.322 The three factors look to whether a nonprofit can
show that it (1) is serving a charitable purpose, (2) is able to act exclusively
in furtherance of the purpose, and (3) retains control over management
decisions.323 The first factor is not a problem because a nonprofit’s role in
SIBs is to provide services to a targeted charitable class.324 The second
factor may be an issue in SIBs, considering that the charitable purpose is
inseparable from the investor’s underlying profit component—which
depends upon the successful execution of the program’s charitable
purpose.325 Lastly, the third factor of control is unlikely to be an issue in
SIBs. Unlike joint ventures, the nonprofits and private parties in SIBs are
not bound to decisions from a board.326 In SIBs, the participating
nonprofits are bound to serve a specified class, yet they are capable of

317. See supra notes 198, 210 and accompanying text.
318. See generally LEV ET AL., supra note 221.
319. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (noting how investors are likely to
require that proven nonprofits are selected to justify participating in the SIB).
320. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
321. See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 25.
322. See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 14–16.
323. See id.
324. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
325. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13 (explaining the cash flows and connections
between the SIB parties).
326. See Mirkay, supra note 158, at 23 (noting the importance for nonprofits to control
the board of directors in private joint ventures).
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retaining control to formulate and implement the program to fulfill the
SIB.327
Altogether, the three factors seem to weigh in favor of allowing nonprofit
SIB participants to maintain their tax-exempt status. As noted in the
Redlands and St. David’s decisions, the importance of retaining control is a
key factor in determining private benefit in joint ventures.328 Since
nonprofits in SIBs serve a charitable purpose and are capable of exercising
control over their operations, it is unlikely that participation would result in
an impermissible private benefit if the IRS were to analyze the issue under
the whole-entity joint venture framework.
If the IRS were to utilize the ancillary joint framework instead, the
exemption would even face less scrutiny because control over operations is
not required and the IRS takes a more deferential approach.329
Complicating this possibility, it is somewhat more difficult to analogize
SIBs to ancillary joint ventures.
Ancillary joint ventures are often designed to continue or expand
charitable services with minimal financial risk to the charitable entity.330
The typical ancillary joint ventures have been utilized in situations where
large nonprofit institutions, such as schools and hospitals, partner with a
private entity to operate small side projects together.331 SIBs may require
the participating nonprofits to direct most or all of their assets to pursue
their targeted goals, given the advantages of selecting proven nonprofits
capable of scaling-up successful operations to a larger charitable class.332
Yet, a SIB could be structured more like an ancillary joint venture by
dividing up the program between multiple nonprofits, where each nonprofit
provides a portion of the services required in a comprehensive outreach
program.333 If this were the case and the IRS were to use the Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 analysis, nonprofits in SIBs could avoid the private benefit
problem if participation would only account for an insubstantial portion of
the organization’s overall activities.334 Regardless, the precedential value
of Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is tenuous considering private benefit is never
explicitly mentioned in the text and academics continue to debate its proper
interpretation.335
Since SIBs are not quite the same as joint ventures, there is no guarantee
the IRS will employ either joint venture private benefit framework to
determine the issue. Despite this, if the IRS chooses to scrutinize the
private benefit occurring in SIBs similar to either the whole-entity or

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3–5, 7–8.
See supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
See SANDERS, supra note 72, at 16–17.
See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1094.
See id. at 1095.
See SOCIAL FINANCE, supra note 21, at 17.
See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 10–11.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 182–87.
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ancillary joint ventures, participating nonprofits stand a good chance of
retaining the tax exemption.
E. Conclusions
Having examined the SIB’s private benefit issue in comparison with
incidental private benefit transactions, likely private benefit transactions,
and joint venture private benefit transactions, this part has illustrated how
the IRS may view the issue. It is important to remember that the majority
of the preceding analysis assumes that the IRS would seek to use a more
aggressive ex post approach to scrutinize the profit payout to private
investors.336 If the IRS takes the broader ex ante view of SIBs, the threat of
a private benefit issue is very attenuated.337 Even under the ex post
approach, there is a strong argument that the private benefit possible in
SIBs should be deemed incidental and not similar enough to any of the
likely private benefit transactions.338
Despite these indications to the contrary, private benefit could persist as
an issue since the doctrine remains an ad hoc tool, which the IRS has used
“even when charitable purposes might globally outweigh a private benefit
transaction.”339 Some valuable charitable goals can only be achieved by
conferring third-party profits, however this fact does not excuse application
of the private benefit doctrine.340 While it would be difficult to find a
prohibited private benefit in a conventional SIB arrangement, the lingering
private benefit specter may deter certain nonprofits from engaging in a SIB
if it could jeopardize their tax exemption. If SIBs become implemented on
a widespread basis, it could result in a push to modify the current private
benefit framework in force.
The impact of SIBs is just beginning to be felt as more programs are
being finalized and more investors become comfortable with the model.341
In the wake of further expansion, the nonprofit industry and regulators
could be forced to face the lurking private benefit issue identified and
analyzed in this Note. While the IRS may not have a problem with SIBs in
their current promising infancy, perhaps its stance will change when
Goldman or other institutional investors begin to realize the profits from the
successful work of nonprofits participating in SIBs.

336. See discussion supra Part II.A.
337. Id.
338. Aside from the perceived conflict with the questionable American Campaign
Academy analysis.
339. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1083.
340. See Jones, supra note 33, at 985.
341. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 11–12.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NONPROFITS PARTICIPATING IN SOCIAL
IMPACT BONDS TO AVOID THE PRIVATE BENEFIT ISSUE
AND RETAIN THEIR EXEMPTION
This part seeks to offer solutions to the private benefit issue in SIBs and
ensure that nonprofit participants will not jeopardize their tax-exempt
status. Part III.A suggests how nonprofits could seek a legislative or
regulatory exemption to the private benefit doctrine. Part III.B offers
recommendations on how SIBs can be structured in a specific manner to
mitigate the potential private benefit issue.
A. Seek Legislative or Regulatory Changes to the Private Benefit Doctrine
First, this section examines the debate over whether protecting nonprofit
participants in SIBs from private benefit concerns would be a sound policy
choice. Then, it closes by discussing how a governmental change to the
private benefit doctrine could be accomplished.
1. Whether the Government Should Protect Social Impact Bonds from the
Private Benefit Doctrine: The Social Impact Bond Policy Debate
While none of the implemented SIBs have matured at this point, there
has already been much commentary supporting or criticizing the concept.342
To better understand the magnitude of the private benefit issue, it is
important to consider the positive and negative policy implications of SIBs.
If SIB advocates decide to seek governmental support against private
benefit, there are several arguments why SIBs deserve protection. As
previously discussed in Part I.A.2, one of the main policy rationales for the
existence of the private benefit doctrine is to ensure that the charitable
purpose is preserved.343 Since SIBs are designed to clearly serve a
charitable purpose,344 despite the accompanying potential for private
profits, using the private benefit doctrine to revoke the tax exemption for
participating nonprofits would be counterproductive. In addition, if a
nonprofit loses the exemption, it will normally reduce or eliminate the
amount of charitable goods and services provided.345 While SIBs may
confer profits on private investors, the concurrent public good is likely to be
far greater—a justification that should spare nonprofits from vulnerability
to the private benefit doctrine. Unless the government can offer some
protection for nonprofits contemplating SIBs, fears over losing the federal
tax exemption could prevent further participation and limit the execution of
major social programs for the poor. Without the risk of revocation, SIBs
could lead to increased capital contributions to nonprofits and more

342. See supra notes 20, 229 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
344. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 6–7 (detailing the various possible SIB
applications to address social challenges).
345. See Jones, supra note 94, at 716.
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effective charity work.346 Lastly, it is important to solve this issue because
if it remains unanswered, potential interference from the amorphous private
benefit doctrine could “discourage efficiency and ultimately harm charitable
beneficiaries.”347
Several commentators have taken a skeptical approach to SIBs,
concerned that participation could lead to nonprofit “mission drift.”348 One
writer has noted that mingling nonprofit goals with for-profit ones could
end up corrupting the underlying good being accomplished.349 Professor
Mark Rosenman echoed these views when asked about the potential effects
of SIBs, stating, “When we seek to introduce the profit motive, we begin to
abandon who we are as a people and abandon our responsibility for the
common good in pursuit of private profit.”350 Raising a separate issue,
some nonprofit leaders worry that nonprofit giving would shift toward
profit-driven SIBs and away from outright donations.351
Despite these potential negatives, SIBs provide an innovative method to
expand funding to nonprofits that benefits a large charitable class without
requiring immediate governmental financial commitments or close
oversight.352 Each SIB participant’s interests are aligned to ensure that the
charitable purpose is properly served throughout the term of the SIB,
leaving the profit motive in the background.353 SIBs are not intended to be
a complete replacement for governmental grants or donations,354 limiting
concerns that SIBs could divert money away from conventional funding
methods. Further, SIBs will always be more expensive for the government
than conventional nonprofit funding methods because of the potential
interest payment to investors and the associated costs in developing and
tracking the performance metrics.355 Ultimately, SIBs attempt to bring
together successful nonprofits, socially conscious investors, and
governmental agencies to remedy serious social issues and reduce
government obligations.356 If this proposition is accepted, it is clear that
nonprofits participating in SIBs should have their tax-exempt status
protected from the private benefit doctrine.

346. See Archer, supra note 35, at 161–62.
347. See Jones, supra note 65, at 589 (discussing the negative impact from the vague
limits of the private inurement doctrine, which equates closely to the poorly defined private
benefit doctrine).
348. Mission drift has been defined as the cultural shift from a nonprofit purely motivated
by charitable ends to one driven by profitable means. See Bucholtz, supra note 64, at 434.
349. See M.S., supra note 16.
350. See Preston, supra note 197.
351. See id.
352. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 6, 9; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
353. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 57.
354. See Preston, supra note 197.
355. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 49.
356. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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2. How the Government Could Limit the Private Benefit Issue
While the IRS seemingly would have a hard time finding a valid private
benefit in SIBs,357 the issue could linger and raise doubt unless there is a
clear indication to the contrary from the government. Even following the
September 11th attacks, a governmental response was required to allay
private benefit concerns relating to relief payments for victims and their
families.358 Since cash grants to disaster victims not classified as “poor”
could result in a prohibited private benefit, the IRS responded with Notice
2001-78 to quell any possible issues.359 In the notice, the IRS claimed that
such grants would be considered for an exempt purpose if made “in good
faith using objective standards.”360 Even this assurance from the IRS was
not enough to dispel private benefit concerns and Congress enacted
legislation that effectively removed the private benefit analysis from
September 11th disaster relief payments.361 Lacking even the assurances of
an IRS statement akin to Notice 2001-78, nonprofits that participate in SIBs
will remain vulnerable to the private benefit doctrine.
Given the lessons from the September 11th donations, supporters of SIBs
could lobby the government to waive the private benefit issue for
participating nonprofits. While it may be difficult to mobilize legislation to
support SIBs as they remain in their infancy, a supportive statement or
regulation from the IRS could be sought instead. In fact, Congress
delegated authority to the IRS to determine when third-party profit taking is
consistent with the federal tax exemption.362 The IRS could be pressured to
use this authority to waive private benefit analysis for nonprofits that
participate in SIBs. Even a nonbinding pronouncement similar to Notice
2001-78 that the IRS will not pursue private benefit challenges against
nonprofits in SIBs would be beneficial.
Going a step further, the private benefit issue in SIBs could present a
good opportunity for the IRS to overhaul the private benefit doctrine.
Professor Jones has suggested that the private benefit doctrine should be
simplified to a deferential business judgment rule analysis when a nonprofit
organization confers profits to third parties indispensable to the charitable
goal.363 This approach argues that the IRS “should not substitute its
judgment for that of nonprofit managers regarding the degree to which
accomplishing the charitable goal is worth explicit third-party profittaking.”364 Utilizing this framework in the SIB context, participating
357. See supra Part II.E.
358. See Colombo, supra note 92, at 1101.
359. I.R.S. Notice 01-78, 01-2 C.B. 576.
360. Id.
361. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 104, 115 Stat.
2427, 2431 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Colombo,
supra note 92, at 1101.
362. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(4) (2006); see Jones, supra note 33, at 995.
363. See Jones, supra note 33, at 987.
364. Id.
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nonprofits would likely receive the deferential business judgment rule
because the successful fulfillment of charitable goals is indispensable to
achieving private profits.365 Given the purported merits of SIBs,366 the
benefits of adopting Professor Jones’s approach could provide a muchneeded limit on the boundless private benefit doctrine.
Although Congress has acknowledged that nonprofit legislation is
outdated and in need of reappraisal,367 there have been no clear indications
they will take action to change this anytime soon. Perhaps the emergence
of SIBs will provide an extra impetus for changes to the private benefit
doctrine as both the government and nonprofits would stand to achieve
significant benefits if SIBs are supported.368
B. Structure the Social Impact Bond To Mitigate Private Benefit
To avoid the costs, difficulty, and slow pace of lobbying for doctrinal
changes, an easier solution would be to simply structure SIBs in the manner
least likely to run afoul of the private benefit doctrine. The remainder of
this part provides a few suggestions on how to accomplish this.
First, the government originating a SIB should attempt to set the
expected payout to private investors at zero or less. The government is
likely to have control over this because they typically are the party
responsible for initiating a SIB once it has identified a specific public
outreach goal that will result in cost savings.369 Since private investors
stand to lose 100 percent of their investment if there is no supportive
guarantee370 and the benchmarks are not met,371 SIBs can carry a negative
expected payout, despite the potential interest to be paid. Setting an
expected payout at zero or less would consequently limit the kinds of
investors likely to be interested in SIBs to those who prioritize philanthropy
over financial profits.372 This solution may prove particularly effective if
the IRS uses an ex ante approach373 to frame the private benefit issue.
Assuming this were to be the case, the expected negative value to investors
as a whole suggests that the private benefit would almost certainly be
deemed incidental and the tax exemption would be undisturbed.
Second, SIBs should be designed to ensure that no money passes through
the nonprofits, other than that necessary to implement the program or scaleup operations. If a tax-exempt nonprofit directly participates in the
365. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part III.A.1.
367. See Bucholtz, supra note 64, at 445 n.146.
368. See supra Part I.B.2.
369. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 7.
370. In contrast, the Bloomberg Philanthropies guarantee in the Rikers Island SIB limited
the downside investment risk for the private investors. See text accompanying notes 17–19.
371. See Costa & Kohli, supra note 13 (explaining how the money flows and returns are
paid in a SIB).
372. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 39–40 (discussing the types of investors
likely to be interested in SIBs).
373. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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exchange of funds with the government and investors as in a “selfimplemented” SIB,374 private benefit is more likely to be an issue. It would
be preferable to keep this money-transferring role separate from the
nonprofits that provide the services to the charitable class in the SIB. This
can be accomplished by utilizing an independent intermediary organization
to disburse funds to the nonprofits and transfer money from the government
to the private investors375—further isolating the tax-exempt nonprofits from
the for-profit components of the SIB. While the inclusion of a separate
intermediary organization would not entirely eliminate a participating
nonprofit’s connection to private profits, it would diminish the already
tenuous argument for finding a private benefit in SIBs.
Lastly, the participating nonprofits should be given control over how they
will interact with the charitable class and implement the SIB program.
Given the lessons from Redlands and St. David’s, control in whole-entity
joint ventures has become a crucial component to determine private
benefit.376 To account for this, a government agency could implement a
SIB by specifying the desired outcome and timeframe but leave the details
on how to accomplish this to the participating nonprofits.377 If nonprofits
in SIBs retain control over their day-to-day operations, it is less likely the
private investors’ tangential profit motive will interfere with their charitable
goals. Since the private benefit doctrine seeks to ensure that the charitable
purpose is not overly disturbed by third-party profit-taking,378 allowing
participating nonprofits to retain control could be an important step to avoid
revocation of the tax exemption.
While each of these structural suggestions could prove beneficial to
nonprofits attempting to avoid the private benefit issue, they also create
friction with other SIB participants. Lowering expected payouts will turn
away certain investors,379 using a separate intermediary organization will
increase costs to the government,380 and ceding too much control to
nonprofits will increase the risk that the SIB may fail to accomplish the
desired social outcomes.381 As a result, nonprofits should expect to face
some difficulty when bargaining for these or other structural solutions that
could mitigate private benefit concerns.

374. For a clear graphical representation of how the participants interact in a “selfimplemented” SIB, see COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 10.
375. See id. at 13.
376. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
377. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 3–4 (suggesting that the government should not
mandate how nonprofits should accomplish the desired outcomes).
378. See supra Part I.A.2.
379. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
380. See MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 2, at 40–41, 48 (noting that intermediaries will
likely require management fees).
381. See COSTA ET AL., supra note 22, at 16.
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CONCLUSION
SIBs present an important new method to implement major social
programs and scale-up successful nonprofits by changing the conventional
social service funding paradigm—shifting the financial risk of failed
programs from the government to private investors. Private benefit remains
a threat to nonprofits participating in SIBs mainly due to muddled
interpretations that have allowed the doctrine to apply to a wide variety of
transactions where a private party profits in connection with nonprofit
activities.
While it is possible to compare SIBs with past forms of private benefit,
the SIB structure defies convention and cannot be simply analogized.
Overall, the risk of violating the private benefit doctrine is low in SIBs
considering there are strong indications that the IRS would consider any
private profits incidental to the overreaching charitable purpose; however,
this is no guarantee. Ideally, the government should take action to dispel
the specter of private benefit embedded in SIBs to encourage further
nonprofit SIB participation, which is capable of expanding services to the
poor and needy. Until this is accomplished, nonprofits should take the risk
that SIB participation will not violate the private benefit doctrine and seek
to mitigate this possibility by bargaining for certain structural protections.

